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Facing up to the uncertainties of Covid-19 
The human tendency to impose a single interpretation in ambiguous situations carries huge dangers 
in addressing Covid-19. We need actively to search for multiple interpretations; and governments 
need to choose policies which are robust if their preferred theory turns out to be wrong. 
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How are governments, and individuals, supposed to react to an unprecedent crisis? The impact of 
Covid-19 is resonating across the world; and yet we know so little about the virus, and how people 
across different parts of the world have, or will, modify their behaviour in response to the threat. 
Lock-downs in China and South Korea have been remarkably effective, in the short term at least; 
would the same approach work in, say, Europe, Africa, or the US? We don’t know, either, whether 
the virus will flare up as restrictions are released; or whether maintaining enhanced hygiene and 
social distancing, and/or rigorous programs of mass-testing and contact tracing might be able to 
stamp these out.  
In situations of extreme uncertainty, our brains struggle to organize this confusing mass of partial 
and jumbled information into a coherent interpretation. And we make decisions as if that 
interpretation is true, without entertaining alternatives. This strategy can often serve us pretty well; 
but sometimes it leads to bad, and even disastrous, decision making. The misinterpretation of the 
Covid-19 outbreak has the potential to have devastating consequences.  
At its most fundamental level, there are three interpretations of the challenge that face the 
governments of the world, which we might term ’storm in a tea-cup,’ ‘house on fire,’ and ‘holding 
back the tide.’ 
 The first interpretation is the mind’s natural default: most alarms are false alarms; most panics are 
overblown; so probably this one is too. China’s now notorious early attempts to suppress news of 
the outbreak makes sense only on the ‘teacup’ interpretation; similarly, with the downplaying of the 
crisis with the US President’s comment on February 24 that the virus is “…very much under control 
in the USA” (https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1232058127740174339). According to 
this interpretation of the situation, the main aim is that people do not panic unnecessarily; the 
problem will resolve itself on its own (for example, with the arrival of warmer weather).  
The ‘house on fire’ interpretation has driven unprecedented lock-downs first in China, the South 
Korea, Japan, followed by Europe and the US. According to this viewpoint, tackling the virus is an 
overwhelming priority; the economic and social impacts of shutting down or drastically reducing 
sports, restaurants, pubs, flights, and much more, will be vast but have to be endured, rather like 
collateral water damage, however severe, caused by the firefighter’s hose. This interpretation of the 
situation also implies taking the strongest action, as early as possible. The right time to start fighting 
a fire is: immediately! 
The UK government, until the Prime Minister’s press conference on Monday 16 March, appeared to 
be working with the third narrative. The ‘holding back the tide’ viewpoint sees beating down the 
virus as workable only as a temporary stop-gap: we can build temporary defences against a rising 
tide, but inundation is unavoidable. If this is right, containment of the virus is not ultimately possible, 
and  our aim should be to minimizing the impact of its spread, by, for example,actively ‘flattening 
the peak’ to manage the burden on health-services, and reduce the possibility of flare-up during 
winter, when those services are under most strain. The end-game would be ‘herd immunity,’ which 
would be hoped to set in when perhaps 60-80% of the population had been infected by, and 
recovered from, the virus. From this point of view, immediate aggressive countermeasures may not 
be appropriate---what is required is a staged approach, to manage the smoothest possible progress 
of the virus through the population.  
The tendency to lock on to a single narrative, and make decisions on that basis is, on reflection, an 
elementary blunder. Indeed, the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird has described this tendency---
considering only one model of the world, and failing to search for, or even consider the existence of, 
any others---as perhaps the most fundamental error in human reasoning. What we should do 
instead, of course, is to recognize when we don’t know which interpretation is right: and to make 
decisions that are as robust as possible, whichever interpretation turns out to be correct.  
In the early days and weeks of Covid-19, the ‘tea-cup’ interpretation may have seemed credible to 
many; even perhaps the most credible. But, given the serious possibility that the other, much more 
alarming, interpretation might be correct, then immediately engaging in extensive precautionary 
measures would seem essential (at minimum, ramping up production of ventilators and ECMO 
machines, and personal protective equipment; but also engaging in rapid travel restrictions as 
brought in early by the US).  
The evidence is now clear: the ‘tea-cup’ interpretation is decisively falsified. But can we beat the 
virus back? Is this a containable fire or an inevitable rising tide? The truth is that governments and 
scientists can’t yet be sure. But by not making the most strenuous efforts to put out the fire 
immediately, we will certainly fail, with the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. The 
science will become clearer, countermeasures will be further developed, and health systems better 
prepared over the coming months. Whether we can ultimately succeed in eliminating or neutralizing 
Covid-19 for good, the rational policy response is to fight it now, with everything we have.  
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